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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-1629
___________
LOUIS PAUL TOSCANO,
                                                             Appellant
v.
CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
also known as CIGNA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. No. 05-cv-04833
 (Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 23, 2008
Before: McKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 30, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Louis Paul Toscano appeals, pro se, from an order of the district court dismissing
his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the reasons that
  CGLIC also made a separate payment of $1,000 to Toscano.1
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follow, we will affirm.
I.
On July 6, 2001, Toscano commenced a suit against Connecticut General Life
Insurance Company (“CGLIC”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey in which he alleged
that CGLIC wrongfully terminated his disability benefits.  Toscano sought an order
reinstating those benefits under the terms of a group long-term disability insurance policy
issued by CGLIC to AT&T (his former employer).  The matter was removed to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and was resolved by a
settlement agreement and general release executed by the parties on January 8, 2002.  The
agreement provided, in part, that commencing on January 1, 2002, CGLIC would
reinstate monthly long-term disability benefit payments to Toscano.   CGLIC continues to1
make these payments.  The district court entered a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice
on January 23, 2002.
Dissatisfied with this—allegedly pyrrhic—victory, Toscano filed the instant action
on October 5, 2005.  In the instant complaint, Toscano challenges appellee’s involvement
in his departure, and his subsequent assignment to long-term disability benefits, by AT&T
in 1992.  He further claims that conditions placed on the receipt of his long-term
disability benefit payments by CGLIC prevented him from obtaining employment and that
CGLIC assisted AT&T in wrongfully terminating him.  On October 6, 2006, CGLIC
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moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing
that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claims asserted were
identical to those resolved previously by the settlement agreement.  The district court
agreed with CGLIC, noting that Toscano’s claim was barred by claim preclusion, and
granted CGLIC’s motion to dismiss on February 16, 2007.   Toscano filed a timely
appeal.  
II.
 Our review of a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss is plenary. 
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). 
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we must view all facts,
and reasonable inferences based on those facts, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.  See id.  Generally, “[t]o the extent that [a] court considers evidence
beyond the complaint in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, it is converted to a motion for
summary judgment.”  Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co ., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999).  The
defense of claim preclusion, however, may be raised and adjudicated on a motion to
dismiss and the court can take notice of all facts necessary for the decision.  Cf. Connelly
Found. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 461 F.2d 495, 496 (3d Cir. 1972) (res judicata
may be raised in motion to dismiss prior to answer).  Specifically, a court may take
judicial notice of the record from a previous court proceeding between the parties.  See
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). 
  “Claim preclusion and issue preclusion are the currently accepted terms for two2
different applications of the doctrine of res judicata.”  Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929
F.2d 960, 961 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991).  Settlement agreements involve claim preclusion, not
issue preclusion.  See United States v. Int’l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953).
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“The party seeking to take advantage of claim preclusion has the burden of establishing
it.”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2001).  
III.
We will affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s
opinion.  Claim preclusion prevents claims between the same parties from being litigated
anew after a final judgment has been entered in a previous suit.   See Semtek Int’l v.2
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001).  The plaintiff is required to “present in
one suit all the claims for relief that he may have arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence.”  Lubrizol Corp., 929 F.2d at 963.  “[A] somewhat modified form of res
judicata” applies if a settlement agreement triggers a dismissal and a defendant’s
consequent discharge.  Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1291
(11th Cir. 2004); see also Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that a class action settlement is “not simply a contract entered into by
private parties, but is one that has been given a stamp of approval by the court”).  The
express terms of a settlement agreement, not merely the terms of the judgment, determine
the bounds of preclusion after a settlement.  See Norfolk S. Corp., 371 F.3d at 1291
(holding that “to preclude a wider range of matters than those specified in the Agreement
  In United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1984), this3
court articulated a multi-factor test to aid in the determination of whether two causes of
action are identical for res judicata purposes:
(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same
(that is, whether the wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both
actions); (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the
witnesses and documents at trial are the same (that is, whether the same
evidence necessary to maintain the second action would have been
sufficient to support the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged are
the same.
Id. at 984 (citations and alterations omitted); see also In re Eastern Minerals & Chemicals
Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2000).
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would frustrate the parties’ expressed intent and bestow upon [the defendant] a windfall
of immunity from litigation”).  Judicially approved settlement agreements are considered
final judgments on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion.  See, e.g., Langton v.
Hogan, 71 F.3d 930, 935 (1st Cir. 1995).  Additionally, the identity of the cause of action
refers not only to claims actually litigated, but to those that could have been litigated in
the earlier suit if they arise from the same underlying transaction or events.   See3
Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 964. 
The district court correctly dismissed Toscano’s instant complaint on the basis of
claim preclusion.  First, the parties here are plainly the same parties to the previous
action.  Cf. Bandai Am. Inc. v. Bally Midway Mfg. Co.,  775 F.2d 70, 74 -75 (3d Cir.
1985).  Second, as the district court properly concluded, a close examination of both the
settlement agreement and the complaint here reveals that the factual underpinnings, the
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theory of the action, and the relief sought, are nearly identical to those issues previously
resolved.  Toscano again contests his disability status and his receipt of disability benefits. 
The action at issue is premised upon the same “cause of action” as the prior suit between
the parties, which led to them coming to the terms of the agreement between them, and
the instant matter is thus barred by claim preclusion. 
IV.
Appellant’s complaint was properly dismissed and we will affirm the judgment of
the district court.
